Abstract-In this work, we design a method for creating public key broadcast encryption systems. Our main technical innovation is based on a new "two equation" technique for revoking users. This technique results in two key contributions:
I. INTRODUCTION
In a broadcast encryption system [18] , a broadcaster encrypts a message such that a particular set S of devices can decrypt the message sent over a broadcast channel. Broadcast systems have a wide range of applications including file systems, group communication, DVD content distribution, and satellite subscription services. In many of these applications, the notion of revocation is important. For example, if a DVD-player's key material is leaked on the Internet, one might want to revoke it from decrypting future disks. In another example, consider a group of nodes communicating sensitive control and sensor information over a wireless network; if any of these nodes becomes compromised, we'd like to revoke them from all future broadcasts.
In this work, we design new broadcast encryption schemes, and we focus on two important contributions.
Revocation Systems with Small Key Sizes. : We create public key revocation encryption systems with small cryptographic private and public keys. Our systems have two important features relating respectively to public and private key size.
First, public keys in our two systems are short (just 5 group elements and 12 group elements respectively) and enable a user to create a ciphertext that revokes an unbounded number of users. This is in contrast to other systems [8] , [32] , [16] where the public parameters bound the number of users in the system and must be updated to allow more users.
Second, the cryptographic key material that must be stored securely on the receiving devices is small. Keeping the size of private key storage as low as possible is important as cryptographic keys will often be stored in tamper-resistant memory, which is more costly. This can be especially critical in small devices such as sensor nodes, where maintaining low device cost is particularly crucial. Device keys in our systems are only a small constant number of group elements (in fact, just 3 group elements and 5 group elements respectively) from an elliptic-curve group of prime order. Furthermore, our schemes are public-key stateless broadcast encryption schemes, and we work with stateless receivers. We achieve this small device key size without compromising on other critical parameters such as ciphertext length -our ciphertexts will consist of just O(r) group elements, where r is the number of revoked users. This is the same behavior as the previously best-known schemes for revocation. We also do not compromise on security: we obtain adaptive security in the standard model under the well-established d-BDH and decisional Linear assumptions.
Attribute-Based Encryption with Non-Monotonic Formulas.: Our second key contribution is that we show how our techniques can be applied to achieving efficient Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [34] schemes with nonmonotonic access formulas. Ostrovsky, Sahai, and Waters [33] showed a connection between revocation schemes and achieving non-monotonic access formulas in ABE; to negate an attribute in an access formula one applies a revocation scheme using the attribute as an identity to be revoked. Ostrovsky, Sahai, and Waters give a particular instance by adapting the revocation scheme of Naor and Pinkas [32] to the ABE scheme of Goyal et. al [23] . The primary drawback of their scheme is that the private key size of their scheme blows up by a multiplicative factor of log n, where n is the maximum number of attributes. More precisely, once the DeMorgan's law transformation is made, each negated attribute in the private key will have O(log n) group elements. By adapting our new revocation techniques to the Goyal et. al ABE scheme, we get that each negated attribute will only take two group elements. In practice, for many applications the private key storage will decrease by an order of magnitude.
Our Techniques.: The primary challenge in constructing broadcast encryption schemes is to achieve full collusion resilience -to make sure that if all the revoked users combine their key material, they still cannot decrypt ciphertexts.
In order to understand our techniques, it is useful to review the Naor-Pinkas [32] revocation scheme. Naor and Pinkas additionally show how to combine their scheme with traitortracing, but we will only be concerned with revocation. In their system, in order to revoke r users 1 a degree r polynomial q(x) is chosen and O(r) group elements are published allowing anyone to compute g q(x) for generator g in group G of order p. A private key for user i consists of q(i). To encrypt, a user selects a revoked set of users S and a secret exponent s ∈ Z p . The ciphertext consists of g s along with g sq(j) for each revoked user j in the set S. If an attacker consists of just users from the set S, he will be unable to produce any new points of the polynomial s·q(x). From a high level view, this system revokes by giving revoked users redundant information. The system provides collusion resistance by defining a "global" polynomial across the whole system. Unfortunately, this structure inherently locks the system to a predetermined maximum number of revoked users and a long public key.
In order to avoid these limitations, we propose a new methodology for building revocation systems. Like the NaorPinkas system, we use the idea of revocation by redundant equations. However, instead of using a system that defines a global polynomial, we let the encryption algorithm define several "local" revocation equations. Our techniques have two major components:
First, we use a "two equation" method for decryption. A ciphertext will be encrypted such that a certain set S = {ID 1 , . . . , ID r } will be revoked from decrypting it. (For our second system, we think of identities ID i as being indices between 1 and n, where n is the number of users in the system.) Since the ciphertext consists of O(r) group elements, there will be a ciphertext component for each ID i . Intuitively, when decrypting, a user ID will apply his secret key to each component. If ID = ID i , he will get two independent equations and be able to extract the i th decryption share. However, if ID = ID i (i.e. he is revoked), then he will only get two dependent equations of a two variable formula and thus be unable to extract the decryption 1 To revoke less than r users, they simply revoke some "dummy" users.
share. Alternatively, we can view each ciphertext component as locally defining a different degree one polynomial. For component i, a user ID will get two points on a fresh degree one polynomial q i (x) iff ID = ID i (and otherwise the user will essentially only get one point on the polynomial, which is not enough to solve). We can view this as a local revocation of each user to a component of the ciphertext.
One large challenge of our "local" revocation approach is that we need to make sure that multiple users cannot collude to decrypt the message. For example, if there is a ciphertext that revokes S = {ID 1 , ID 2 }, these users might try to decrypt by letting user ID 2 get the first share and user ID 1 obtain the second share. To prevent this attack, our key shares are randomized or "personalized" to each user to prevent combination of decryption shares. To do this, we introduce cancelation techniques based on the power of a bilinear map.
Our first (simpler) system clearly demonstrates our techniques and is shown to be selectively secure under a new non-interactive assumption that we call the decisional qMulti Exponent Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (q-MEBDH) assumption. We formally define this assumption in Appendix II-C. We show the assumption to hold in the generic bilinear group model in the full version 2 . We prove security in the standard static model, showing that a ciphertext that revokes up to r users is secure if the decisional r-MEBDH assumption holds.
Our second system combines the techniques of our first system with the recent dual system encryption technique of Waters [42] . This technique was used to give a fully secure IBE system under the d-BDH and decisional Linear Assumptions which we will adapt to form our revocation system. We prove our system to be adaptively secure in the standard model under the well-established d-BDH and decisional Linear assumptions. The clear advantage of this system over our first system is its adaptive security and reliance on simpler, more standard assumptions. Its only (relative) disadvantage is that the constant public and private key sizes are slightly higher than in our first system.
In a dual system, keys and ciphertext can take on two forms: they can either be normal (as used in the real system) or semi-functional. Security for dual systems is proved using a sequence of indistinguishable games, where the ciphertext and keys are changed to be semi-functional one by one. In the intermediate games where the keys switch to semi-functional, the simulator is prepared to create a semifunctional key for any identity and a challenge ciphertext for any allowed subset of revoked identities. This may seem problematic, since the simulator might try to test semifunctionality of the key in question for itself by creating a semi-functional challenge ciphertext where that user is not revoked. We will avoid this issue by making sure the simulator can only form the semi-functional ciphertext properly when the key in question is for a revoked user. This is similar to the technique used in the Broadcast Encryption scheme in [42] which was proven to be adaptively secure, but this system had key sizes which were linear in the number of users while our system achieves constant key sizes.
We believe that our technique will be of use in other cryptographic applications, as well. Recently, Waters [42] applied the revocation techniques of a prior version of this paper to construct new fully secure HIBE schemes based on simple assumptions, and fully secure IBE schemes with very short public parameters.
A. Related Work
Fiat and Naor [18] first introduced the problem of broadcast encryption. In their system they proposed a scheme that is secure against a collusion of t users, where the ciphertext size was O(t log 2 t log n). This system and other following work [38] , [39] , [40] , [28] , [19] , [20] , used a combinatorial approach. For this type of approach, there is an inherent tradeoff between the efficiency of the system and the number, t, of colluders that the system is resistant to. An attacker in the system that compromises more than t users can compromise the security of the scheme.
For systems without a bound on the number of revoked users at setup, there have been two general classes of revocation broadcast schemes. The first stateless tree-based revocation schemes were proposed by Naor, Naor and Lopspeich [31] where they introduced the "subset cover" framework. In their framework users were assigned to leaves in a tree and belonged to different subsets. An encryptor encrypts to the minimum number of subsets that covers all the non-revoked users and none of the revoked ones. The primary challenge is to structure the subsets so that they are expressive enough to allow for small ciphertext overhead, yet don't impose large private key overhead on the user. The NNL paper proposed two systems with ciphertext sizes of O(r lg n) and O(2r) and private key sizes of O(lg n) and O(lg 2 n) respectively. These methods were subsequently improved upon in future works by Halevy and Shamir [25] and by Goodrich, Sun, and Tamassia [22] , where the GST system gives O(r) size ciphertexts and O(lg n) size private keys. Dodis and Fazio [17] show how to make the NNL and Halevy and Shamir systems public key by employing hierarchical identity-based encryption methods. It is unknown how to realize the more efficient GST scheme in the public key setting.
The second class of methods is based on polynomial interpolation in the exponents of group elements and was given by Kurosawa and Desmedt [29] and Naor and Pinkas [32] . In these systems the setup algorithm picks a polynomial of degree d, where d is the maximum number of users that can be revoked. Both the public key and ciphertexts are of size d. Yoo et. al. [44] observe that lg(n) parallel systems can be used to handle n users with O(r) size private keys, O(n) size public keys and O(r) size ciphertexts.
We note that there are a class of stateful encryption schemes known as logical-tree-hierarchy schemes independently discovered by Wallner et al. [41] and Wong [43] , which are improved in further work [11] , [14] , [36] . The drawback of stateful schemes is that if a receiver misses an update it won't be able to decrypt future messages (or this must be corrected somehow). Even so, our stateless solution actually provides a more efficient way to revoke users in the stateful setting than previous schemes.
We remark that two equation techniques are somewhat reminiscent of those used for knowledge extraction in discrete log proof of knowledge settings [35] . In addition, different types of two equation techniques have been applied in ecash applications (see e.g., [10] and the references therein).
We also note that [8] proposed the first non-trivial fully collusion resistant broadcast encryption scheme; broadcasts to a set of uncompromised users remain secure no matter how many other keys the adversary obtained. (In contrast, our approach and those referenced above would lead to very long ciphertexts if the number of revoked users were very large.) Their scheme is proven selectively secure and allows for broadcasts to an arbitrary set of users where the ciphertexts and private key material are both a constant number of group elements, however, the public key material is linear in the number of users in the system and, moreover, the public key must be accessible by any decryptor in the system. This makes their solution unusable for small devices that cannot store the public key. In comparison, our solution is appropriate for applications, like group encryption, where we expect relatively few devices will be compromised and revoked from the encryption and where we need very small storage.
Delerablée, Paillier and Pointcheval [16] use a type of inversion technique to achieve a system with small private keys, but public parameters still require a linear number of group elements in the number of users. 3 Unlike our system, the published public parameters will establish an upper bound on the number of users that may be encrypted to (without "appending" to the public key), although private keys need not be modified. In addition, they obtain security from a non-standard assumption with a number of terms that grows polynomially.
Gentry and Waters [21] recently obtained an adaptively secure broadcast encryption system, but it has large keys (growing linearly with n, the number of users in the system) and is proven secure from a non-standard assumption which depends on n. To obtain adaptive security, they use a "twokey" transformation from semi-statically secure systems to adaptively secure systems. (Semi-static security is a sort of middle-ground between static and adaptive security.) This technique does not seem to extend to revocation systems.
Attribute-Based Encryption was introduced by Sahai and Waters [34] ; subsequent works [23] , [4] , [15] , [33] , [24] have proposed ABE systems with different properties. Different authors [37] , [30] , [2] , [9] , [1] , [3] have considered similar problems without considering collusion resistance.
Key Sizes.: We stress that, as summarized above, all previous public key revocation schemes required 4 either (1) larger private key size by at least a factor of log n, where n is the number of users, or (2) much larger public parameter size, by a factor of n.
B. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we provide the relevant definitions for revocation systems, as well as background on bilinear groups and state our complexity assumptions. We then give the construction of our simple revocation system in Section III and our second system in Section IV. We prove security of our system in Section V. Finally, we show how to realize a non-monotonic Attribute-Based Encryption system with small private key sizes in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
We begin by providing a security definition for a revocation system, in the identity-based framework. We use definitions that are similar, for example, to the definitions for broadcast encryption used by Boneh, Gentry, and Waters [8] ; however we adapt our definition to the IdentityBased setting. Then we give background on bilinear groups and state our complexity assumptions.
A. Revocation Systems
A revocation encryption system is made up of three randomized algorithms: For simplicity of notation, we assume an implicit security parameter of λ.
Setup An authority will run the setup algorithm. The algorithm outputs a public key PK and master secret key MSK.
KeyGen(MSK, ID)
The key generation algorithm takes in the master secret key MSK and an identity, ID. It generates a private key SK ID for the identity.
Encrypt(S, PK, M)
The encryption algorithm takes as input a revocation set S of identities along with the public key and a message M to encrypt. It outputs a ciphertext CT such that any user with a key for an identity ID / ∈ S can decrypt.
Decrypt(S, CT, ID, SK ID )
The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT that was generated for the revocation set S, as well as an identity ID and a private key for it. If ID / ∈ S the algorithm will be able to decrypt and recover the message M encrypted in the ciphertext.
We now define (chosen plaintext) security of a revocation encryption system. Security is defined using the following "Revocation Game" between an attack algorithm A and a challenger.
Setup.
The challenger runs Setup to obtain a public key PK and master secret key MSK. Our definition reflects the scenario where all users in the revoked set S get together and collude (this is because the adversary can get all of the private keys for the revoked set). We note that selective (also called static) security is defined similarly, except that the revoked set S must be declared by the adversary before it sees the public parameters.
Chosen-Ciphertext Security.: We will also consider chosen-ciphertext (CCA) security, where the adversary can also issue decryption queries for ciphertexts that it constructs (as long as the challenge ciphertexts are not equal to the challenge ciphertext). The game is identical to the game above, except decryption queries (for arbitrary revocation sets) are allowed. Our main construction will be chosenplaintext secure; however it can be made CCA-secure using the techniques of Cannetti, Halevi, and Katz [13] .
B. Bilinear Maps
We briefly review the necessary facts about bilinear maps and bilinear map groups. We use the following standard notation [26] , [27] , [5] :
1) G and G T are two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order p; 2) g is a generator of G.
3) e : G × G → G T is a bilinear map. Let G and G T be two groups as above. A bilinear map is a map e : G × G → G T with the following properties:
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group action in G can be computed efficiently and there exists a group G T and an efficiently computable bilinear map e :
C. Complexity Assumptions
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption: The decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem is defined as follows. We choose a group G of prime order p. We choose a random generator g of G and random exponents c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ∈ Z p . If the attacker is given
it must remain hard to distinguish e(g, g) c1c2c3 ∈ G T from a random element of G T .
An algorithm B that outputs z ∈ {0, 1} has advantage in solving decisional BDH in G if
Definition 2. We say the decisional BDH assumption holds if no poly-time algorithm has a non-negligible advantage in solving the decisional BDH problem.
Decisional Linear Assumption: The decisional Linear problem is defined as follows. We choose a group G of prime order p. We choose random generators g, f, ν of G and random exponents c 1 , c 2 ∈ Z p . If the attacker is given
it must remain hard to distinguish ν c1+c2 from a random element of G. q-Decisional Multi-Exponent Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption: To prove the security of our simple system we use a new assumption that we call the q-decisional Multi-Exponent Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our assumption falls within a class of assumptions shown to be secure in the generic group model by Boneh, Boyen, and Goh [7] (see the full version for a proof of this). While our assumption is non-standard, we emphasize that it is noninteractive and thus falsifiable.
Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p. The q-MEBDH problem in G is stated as follows:
A challenger picks a generator g ∈ G and random exponents s, α, a 1 , . . . , a q . The attacker is then given y =
it must remain hard to distinguish e(g, g) α·s ∈ G T from a random element in G T .
An algorithm B that outputs z ∈ {0, 1} has advantage in solving decisional q-parallel BDHE in G if 
III. OUR SIMPLE REVOCATION SYSTEM
We now present our simpler revocation system. Our system has the following features: both public and private keys are of size independent of the number of users (i.e. only a constant number of group elements 5 ); the ciphertext only contains O(r) group elements, where r is the number of revoked users.
Intuition: Our construction uses a novel application of a secret sharing in the exponent. Suppose an encryption algorithm needs to create an encryption with a revocation set S = ID 1 , . . . , ID r of r identities. The algorithm will create an exponent s ∈ Z p and split it into r random shares s 1 , . . . , s r such that s i = s. It will then create a ciphertext such that any user key with ID = ID i will not be able to incorporate the i−th share and thus not decrypt the message.
Our approach presents us with two challenges. First, we need to make sure that a user with revoked identity ID =
The first problem is addressed by the method of decryption. For each share, the ciphertext will have two components. A user with ID = ID i can use these two components to obtain two linearly independent equations (in the exponent) involving the share s i ( and another variable), which he will use to solve for the share s i . However, if ID = ID i he will get two linearly dependent equations and not be able to solve the system. We remark that these techniques are somewhat reminiscent of those used for knowledge extraction in discrete log proof of knowledge settings [35] . In addition, different types of two equation techniques have been applied in ecash applications (see e.g., [10] and the references therein).
To address the second challenge, we randomize each user's private key by an exponent t such that in decryption each user recovers shares t · s i in the exponent. Thus, we disallow useful collusions in a similar manner to some Identity-Based [12] , [6] and Attribute-Based [34] , [23] , [4] encryption systems. Our construction follows.
A. Simple Construction
In the description of our construction we will use a bilinear group G of prime order p. We will assume that identities are taken from the set Z p ; in practice, of course, we can perform a collision resistant hash from identity strings to Z p . We now give our construction as a set of four algorithms.
Setup: The setup algorithm chooses a group G of prime order p. It then picks random generators g, h ∈ G and picks random exponents α, b ∈ Z p . The public key is published as:
The authority keeps α, b as secrets.
Key Gen(MSK, ID):
The key generation algorithm first chooses a random t ∈ Z p and publishes the private key SK ID as:
Encrypt(PK, M, S):
The encryption algorithm first picks a random s ∈ Z p . Then it lets r = |S| and chooses random s 1 , . . . , s r such that s = s 1 + . . . + s r . We let ID i denote the i-th identity in S. It then creates the ciphertext CT as: , g) αs M, C 0 = g s together with, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , r:
Decrypt(S, CT, ID, SK ID ):
If there exists ID ∈ S such that ID = ID then the algorithm aborts; otherwise, the decryption algorithm computes:
which gives us e(g, g)
αs ; this can immediately be used to recover the message M from C . Note that this computation is only defined if ∀i ID = ID i .
We can verify the correctness of the decryption computation.
We obtain the following theorem.
(The proof appears in the full version.)
Theorem 5. Suppose the decisional q-MEBDH assumption holds. Then no poly-time adversary can selectively break our system with a ciphertext encrypted to r
* ≤ q revoked users.
IV. OUR SECOND REVOCATION SYSTEM
This system retains the desirable properties of our simpler system: public and private keys still require only a constant number of group elements, and the ciphertext requires O(r) group elements, where r is the number of revoked users. The primary advantage of this system is that we obtain adaptive security from simple assumptions, namely the decisional Linear assumption and d − BDH.
Intuition:
We combine the techniques of our simple construction with the dual system encryption technique of Waters [42] . Essentially, we append a version of our simple construction onto the core IBE construction of Waters.
A. Construction
We will again use a bilinear group G of order p and assume that identities are in the set {1, . . . , n}, where n is the number of users in the system.
Setup(n):
The setup algorithm chooses a bilinear group G of prime order p. It then chooses random generators  g, v, v 1 , v 2 , w, h ∈ G and random exponents a 1 , a 2 
The public key is published as:
The master secret key is:
We note that to add more users to the system (increase n), it is not necessary to change any other public parameters. We only assume that n is polynomial. We specify that all the identities in the system are indices between 1 and n (note that this makes the ID-space polynomial size).
KeyGen(MSK, ID):
The key generation algorithm chooses random exponents d 1 , d 2 , z 1 , z 2 ∈ Z p and sets
The private key SK ID is:
Encrypt(PK, M, S):
The encryption algorithm chooses random exponents s 1 , s 2 , t 1 , . . . , t r and sets s = s 1 +s 2 , t = t 1 + · · · + t r (where r = |S|, the number of revoked users). We let ID i denote the i-th identity in S. The ciphertext CT is constructed as:
along with, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , r:
Decrypt(S, CT, ID, SK ID ):
If ID = ID i for some ID i ∈ S, then the algorithm aborts. Otherwise, the decryption algorithm begins by computing:
Next, the algorithm computes:
Now,
so if we separately compute e(g, w) d1t , we can cancel this term and compute the blinding factor and hence recover the message. We compute e(g, w) d1t as follows:
Thus, the message can be computed as:
Identity-Based Version:
We can remove the parameter n and the restriction that identities are between 1 and n and allow identities to be in Z p . The resulting construction is selectively secure, but can also be seen as adaptively secure by a complexity leveraging argument, where one accepts degradation of security depending on the size of the identity space. Essentially, our hybrid proof of security requires the simulator to guess the identity of a single key query when it is making the public parameters. When the identity space is polynomial (e.g. 1 to n), this can be correctly guessed with non-negligible probability. When the identity space is exponential (e.g. Z p ), we can achieve selective security by removing the guess (now the simulator knows the queried identities before it has to provide the public parameters) or retain adaptive security by accepting the exponentially small success probability.
V. SECURITY
We will prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6. If the decisional Linear and decisional BDH assumptions hold, then our revocation system above is adaptively secure.
To prove this, we first define semi-functional keys and ciphertexts. These are not used in the real system, but they will be used in our proof of security. These objects have the following functionality: a semi-functional key can decrypt a normal ciphertext and a normal key can decrypt a semifunctional ciphertext. However, a semi-functional key cannot decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext. We define these as in the Waters IBE system: Semi-Functional Ciphertexts: We generate a semifunctional ciphertext by first running the encryption algorithm to produce a normal ciphertext for message M and set S:
Then we set 2 ∀i ∈ S (these values are left unchanged). We choose a random x ∈ Z p , and set the rest of the ciphertext as:
.
Semi-Functional Keys:
We generate a semi-functional key by first running the key generation algorithm to produce a normal private key for identity ID:
We choose a random γ ∈ Z p . We set the rest of the key as:
We will prove selective security of our system under the decisional Linear and d-BDH assumptions through a hybrid argument. We use the following sequence of games.
Game Real : This denotes the real security game. We let Game Real Adv A denote the advantage of an algorithm A in the real security game.
Game 0 : This is the same as Game Real , except that the ciphertext given to the attacker is semi-functional.
Game k : In this game, the ciphertext is semi-functional, and the keys given out for the first k key queries are semifunctional, while the rest of the keys are normal. For an adversary that submits a revocation set S of size r, we will let k range from 0 to r. Note that in Game r , the ciphertext and all the keys are semi-functional.
Game F inal : This is the same as Game r , except that the ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a random message instead of M b .
We show these games are indistinguishable in the following lemmas. 
Lemma 7. Suppose there exists an algorithm
αb . Note that τ 1 (for example) can be computed as τ 1 = vv a1 1 = vf yv 1 . B sends the public parameters to A. Key Generation: B only needs to produce normal keys for ID i for all ID i ∈ S. It can produce these through the usual key generation algorithm since it knows MSK = {g,
Challenge Ciphertext: Once B has given A the public parameters and the keys for all elements of S = {ID 1 , . . . , ID r }, A sends B two messages M 0 , M 1 . B chooses a random value β ∈ {0, 1} and will create a semi-functional ciphertext for M β , S as follows. First, B chooses random exponents, s 1 , s 2 , t 1 , . . . , t r , and uses the normal encryption algorithm to produce C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C 7 , C 1,1 , C 1,2 , . . . , C r,1 , C r,2 . It leaves the terms C i,1 = C i,1 , C i,2 = C i,2 unchanged for i from 1 to r. The rest of the terms are set as:
If T = ν c1+c2 , this will be a normal ciphertext with
If T is random, this will be a properly distributed semi-functional ciphertext. Thus, B can use A's output to obtain the same advantage in distinguishing T = ν c1+c2 from random that A has in distinguishing Game Real from Game 0 . Proof: B first receives an instance of the decisional Linear problem: (G, g, f, ν, g c1 , f c2 , T ). B must decide whether T = ν c1+c2 or is random. To accomplish this, B will call on A by simulating either Game k or Game k−1 . B randomly guesses a value ID k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} for the k th key that A will query.
Setup: B chooses random exponents α, a 1 , a 2 , y v1 , y v2 , y w , y h ∈ Z p and sets the public parameters by computing:
We note that the distribution of these public parameters does not depend on the guess ID k , since y h is randomly chosen. With probability 1 n , B has correctly guessed the k th identity/index that A will query.
Key Generation: To generate a normal key for ID j when j > k, the simulator B can run the usual key generation algorithm, since it knows the MSK. To generate a semi-functional key for ID j when j < k, the simulator can run the semi-functional key generation algorithm described above because it knows the exponents a 1 and a 2 . For ID k , the simulator will create a key that is normal if T = ν c1+c2 and is semi-functional if T is random.
When the k th query is received, if it does not equal the guessed value ID k , the simulator quits. Otherwise, B continues. To generate the key for ID k , B starts by running the usual key generation algorithm to produce a normal key 2 denote the random exponents that were chosen. We then set:
We note that we have implicitly set z 1 = z 1 − y v1 c 2 and
, then this is a normal key with
If T is random, we can write T as T = ν c1+c2 g γ and we obtain a semi-functional key with γ playing the same role as in the semi-functional key definition above.
Challenge Ciphertext: Once B has given A the public parameters and the queried keys, A sends B two messages M 0 , M 1 and the revoked set S, which must include all queried keys. B chooses a random value β ∈ {0, 1} and will create a semi-functional ciphertext for M β , S as follows. First, B uses the normal encryption algorithm with randomly chosen exponents s 1 , s 2 
To add semi-functionality, B chooses a random exponent x ∈ Z p and sets:
To create C 7 , we have implicitly set g t = g t ν a1xa2 . We let y ν denote the unknown discrete log of ν in base g. Then, we have set t = t + y ν a 1 a 2 x, so t is not known to B, but t is. For i = k, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, B sets t i to be a randomly chosen value. We let t denote the sum of these values. Then t k is defined to be t − t + y ν a 1 a 2 x. For i = k, the simulator B knows the value of t i , and so can compute:
For i = k, B computes:
We note that the we could only form the semi-functional ciphertext because ID k ∈ S: otherwise we would not have been able to use the cancelation of w ID k to compute the ciphertext term corresponding to the unknown share. This is an essential feature of our argument: the simulator must not be able to test semi-functionality of key k for itself by doing a test decryption on the semi-functional ciphertext it can create. In this case, such a test will fail because the created key k must always be for a revoked user who cannot decrypt, otherwise the semi-functional challenge ciphertext cannot be created.
In summary, when T = ν c1+c2 and B has guessed correctly, B has properly simulated Game k−1 . When T is random and B has guessed correctly, B has properly simulated Game k . Thus, B can use A's output to obtain the same advantage in distinguishing T = ν c1+c2 from random that A has in distinguishing Game k−1 from Game k , on condition that it guesses correctly. Since this happens with probability 1 n , its overall advantage is n , where is the advantage of A. 
Note that this implicitly sets a 2 to the unknown value c 2 and α to the unknown value c 1 c 2 . B also computes τ 1 = vv 
Challenge Ciphertext: Once B has given A the public parameters and the keys for all elements of S = {ID 1 , . . . , ID r }, A sends B two messages M 0 , M 1 . B chooses a random value β ∈ {0, 1} and will create either a semi-functional ciphertext for M β or a semi-functional encryption of a random message.
B chooses random exponents s 1 , x , t 1 , . . . , t r and sets t = t 1 + · · · + t r . It forms the ciphertext as:
These assignments implicitly set s 2 = c 3 and x = −c 3 + x . If T = e(g, g) c1c2c3 , then this is a properly distributed semi-functional encryption of M β . If T is random, then this is a properly distributed semi-functional encryption of a random message. Thus, B can use A's output to distinguish T = e (g, g) c1c2c3 from random with the same advantage that A has in distinguishing Game r from Game F inal .
VI. ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION
Our simple revocation scheme also gives rise to a new efficient Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) scheme that allows access policies to be expressed in terms of any access formula over attributes. Until the recent work of Ostrovsky, Sahai, and Waters [33] , all previous ABE schemes were limited to expressing only monotonic access structures. Our new ABE scheme, however, achieves significantly superior parameters in terms of key size. In the random oracle model, our new scheme will have the following key sizes: public parameters will be only O(1) group elements, and private keys for access structures involving t leaf attributes will be of size O(t). This is a significant improvement over previous work, which needed public parameters consisting of O(n) group elements, and private keys consisting of O(t log(n)) group elements, where n is a bound on the maximum number of attributes that any ciphertext could have. In our scheme, we do not need any such bound.
For brevity, we only describe at a high level what makes our revocation scheme so amenable to incorporation into ABE schemes. The essential property of our revocation scheme is that successful decryption (if a non-revoked user tries to decrypt) allows the user to recover e (g, g) αs , where α is a system parameter, while s is a random choice made at the time of encryption. This idea can be applied with α replaced by a linear secret share of α that corresponds to a negated leaf node in an access formula. By the properties of linear secret sharing schemes, and the randomization provided by s, this allows for a secure ABE system to be built using our revocation scheme as a building block.
Taken altogether, our revocation scheme gives a new and much more efficient instantiation of the OSW framework for non-monotonic ABE. We now describe our construction. We refer the reader to [33] for definitions. Our proofs appear in the full version.
A. Description of ABE construction
We follow the notation of [33] here, and describe our construction in the random oracle model to highlight the most efficient form of our construction.
Setup.: The setup algorithm chooses generators g, h and picks random exponents α , α , b ∈ Z p . We define α = α · α , g 1 = g α and g 2 = g α .) The public parameters are published as the following, where H is a random oracle that outputs elements of the elliptic curve group: Key Generation: (Ã, MK, PK). This algorithm outputs a key that enables the user to decrypt an encrypted message only if the attributes of that ciphertext satisfy the access structureÃ. We require that the access structureÃ is NM(A) for some monotonic access structure A, (see [33] for a definition of the NM(·) operator) over a set P of attributes, associated with a linear secret-sharing scheme Π. First, we apply the linear secret-sharing mechanism Π to obtain shares {λ i } of the secret α . We denote the party corresponding to the share λ i asx i ∈ P, where x i is the attribute underlyingx i . Note thatx i can be primed (negated) or unprimed (non negated). For each i, we also choose a random value r i ∈ Z p .
The private key D will consist of the following group elements: For every i such thatx i is not primed (i.e., is a non-negated attribute), we have
For every i such thatx i is primed (i.e., is a negated attribute), we have
The key D consists of D i for all shares i. Decryption: (E, D). Given a ciphertext E and a decryption key D, the following procedure is executed: (All notation here is taken from the above descriptions of E and D, unless the notation is introduced below.) First, the key holder checks if γ ∈Ã (we assume that this can be checked efficiently). If not, the output is ⊥. If γ ∈Ã, then we recall thatÃ = NM(A), where A is an access structure, over a set of parties P, for a linear secret sharing-scheme Π. Denote γ = N (γ) ∈ A, and let I = {i :x i ∈ γ }. Since γ is authorized, an efficient procedure associated with the linear secret-sharing scheme yields a set of coefficients Ω = {ω i } i∈I such that i∈I ω i λ i = α. (Note, however, that these λ i are not known to the decryption procedure, so neither is α.)
For every positive (non negated) attributex i ∈ γ (so x i ∈ γ), the decryption procedure computes the following:
i , E For every negated attributex i ∈ γ (so x i / ∈ γ), the decryption procedure computes the following, following a simple analogy to the basic revocation scheme: (3) i , E (2) )/ We note that encryption requires only a single pairing, which may be pre-computed, regardless of the number of attributes associated with a ciphertext. We also note that decryption requires two or three pairings per share utilized in decryption, depending on whether the share corresponds to a non-negated attribute or a negated attribute, respectively.
We also note that we use a random oracle for description simplicity and efficiency of the system. We can, alternatively, realize our hash function concretely as in other previous ABE systems [34] , [23] , [33] .
We prove that the security of our main construction in the attribute-based selective-set model reduces to the hardness of the q-MEBDH assumption. The proof appears in the full version. 
